David Ignatius: Syrian rebels had help from Ukraine in humiliating Russia

The Syrian rebels who swept to power in Damascus last weekend received drones and other support from Ukrainian intelligence operatives who sought to undermine Russia and its Syrian allies, according to sources familiar with Ukrainian military activities abroad.

Ukrainian intelligence sent about 20 experienced drone operators and about 150 first-person-view drones to the rebel headquarters in Idlib, Syria, four to five weeks ago to help Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the leading rebel group based there, the knowledgeable sources said.

The aid from Kyiv played only a modest role in overthrowing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Western intelligence sources believe. But it was notable as part of a broader Ukrainian effort to strike covertly at Russian operations in the Middle East, Africa and inside Russia itself.

Ukraine’s covert assistance program in Syria has been an open secret, though senior Biden administration officials said repeatedly in answer to my questions that they weren’t aware of it. Ukraine’s motivation is obvious: Facing a Russian onslaught inside their country, Ukrainian intelligence has looked for other fronts where it can bloody Russia’s nose and undermine its clients.

The Ukrainians have advertised their intentions. The Kyiv Post in a June 3 article quoted a source in the Ukrainian military intelligence service, known as the GUR, who told the newspaper that “since the beginning of the year, the (Syrian) rebels, supported by Ukrainian operatives, have inflicted numerous strikes on Russian military facilities represented in the region.”

That story, posted online, included a link to video footage that showed attacks on a stone-ribbed bunker, a white van and other targets that it said had been struck by Ukrainian-supported rebels inside Syria. The paper said that the Syria operation was conducted by a special unit known as “Khimik” within the GUR, “in collaboration with the Syrian opposition.”

Russian officials have been complaining for months about the Ukrainian paramilitary effort in Syria. Alexander Lavrentyev, Russia’s special representative for Syria, said in a November interview with TASS, “We do indeed have information that Ukrainian specialists from the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine are on the territory of Idlib.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had made a similar claim in September about “Ukrainian intelligence emissaries” in Idlib. He claimed they were conducting “dirty operations,” according to the Syrian newspaper Al-Watan, which asserted that Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of the GUR, had been in touch personally with HTS.

Before the HTS offensive toppled Assad, Russian officials had asserted that Ukraine’s link with the rebel group was an attempt to recruit Syrian fighters for its war against the Kremlin. A September report in an online site called the Cradle alleged that Ukraine had offered 75 unmanned aerial vehicles in a “drones-for-fighters” deal with HTS. But there isn’t any independent evidence to back this Russian claim.

Russia clearly was surprised by HTS’s rapid advance on Damascus – but interestingly, Russian sources have tried to minimize the Ukrainian role. A Dec. 2 article in Middle East Eye quoted a Russian Telegram account, said to reflect the views of the Russian military, that discounted Kyiv’s assistance: “Firstly, GUR members did visit Idlib, but they stayed there for only a short time” – not enough to train Syrians to operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from scratch. “Secondly,” the message continued, “HTS has long had its own UAV program.”

The Syria operation isn’t the only instance of Ukrainian military intelligence operating abroad to harass Russian operatives. The BBC reported in August that Ukraine had helped rebels in northern Mali ambush Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group. The July 27 attack killed 84 Wagner operatives and 47 Malians, the BBC said.

Andriy Yusov, a GUR spokesman, touted the Mali operation several days later, saying that the Malian rebels “received necessary information, and not just information, which enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals,” according to the BBC. After the attack, Mali severed its diplomatic relations with Ukraine.

Budanov pledged in April 2023 that Ukraine would pursue Russians guilty of war crimes “in any part of the world,” according to a news report. Budanov’s aggressive intelligence operations have sometimes worried the Biden administration, U.S. officials have told me.

I asked Budanov in an interview at his headquarters in Kyiv last April about the GUR’s reported operations against the Wagner militia in Africa. “We conduct such operations aimed at reducing Russian military potential, anywhere where it’s possible,” he answered. “Why should Africa be an exception?”

Like Ukraine’s Africa forays and its assault on the Kursk region inside Russia, the covert operation in Syria reflects an attempt to widen the battlefield – and hurt the Russians in areas where they’re unprepared. Ukraine’s aid wasn’t “the drone that broke that camel’s back,” so to speak. But it helped, in at least a small way, to bring down Russia’s most important client in the Middle East.

And like Israel in its failure to anticipate Hamas’ surge across the Gaza fence on Oct. 7, 2023, Russia saw the Ukrainian-backed rebels coming, but couldn’t mobilize to stop the attack and prevent the devastating consequences.