U.S. forces caught in Baghdad’s crossfire

BAGHDAD, Iraq – Before the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, it was one of the nightmare scenarios: a slugfest in Iraq’s capital, a sprawl of narrow streets, markets and blind alleys that is home to 6 million people.

More than three years later, the close-quarters fight that the United States wanted to avoid is a reality. But rather than fighting Saddam Hussein’s army, U.S. troops are caught in the crossfire alongside Iraqi forces as both try to take back the city from religious-based militias and death squads, insurgents and crime gangs.

“This is the toughest thing I hope I ever do: fighting a counter-insurgency atop a sectarian conflict,” said Col. James Pasquarette, commander of the Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team. The unit is positioned northwest of Baghdad to cut off militia fighters, death squads and insurgents trying to join the fight in the capital.

The Bush administration calls the battle for Baghdad the key to Iraq’s future. But the joint U.S. and Iraqi security operation there, under way since June, has brought a spike in attacks and U.S. casualties.

Last week, Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, the top U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, admitted that the Baghdad offensive, now several months old, was not meeting its objectives of a sustained reduction in violence.

The main reasons for the lack of progress in Baghdad, according to experts and U.S. officers:

“The lack of a political deal to disarm militias has allowed religious and sectarian violence to grow.

“City fighting neutralizes the American military’s edge in technology and firepower.

“Iraqi security forces vary in quality and loyalty and may not be ready for a battle of this intensity.

The battle for the capital is a fight the United States cannot afford to lose, experts and military officials said. “If you don’t win in Baghdad, you can’t win in the rest of the country,” said Thomas X. Hammes, author of “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.”

The U.S. government has pushed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to strike accords to disarm the militias, many of which are Shiite forces with ties to the prime minister and others in government. That would reduce the violence American soldiers face and isolate the remaining insurgents, who are mainly Sunnis.

“You will never have enough troops to secure a city this big” without reaching a political deal, said Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Al-Maliki said in a recent interview that he needs more time to reach agreement with militia groups. Meanwhile, some Iraqi commanders say al-Maliki’s government interferes with security operations to protect its friends.

Maj. Hussein al-Qaisi, a battalion commander with the 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, says he often gets phone calls from government officials when he arrests suspected high-ranking militia leaders, both Sunni and Shiite. “Sometimes they’ll back them up no matter what,” said al-Qaisi, whose unit patrols in northwest Baghdad. “And we have to let them go.”

U.S.-led raids often must be pre-approved by Iraqi leaders. Earlier this month, a unit in Baghdad got a tip about a torture chamber for Shiite death squads, but a planned raid needed clearance from the Iraqi side, said Capt. Kevin Salge, a company commander whose unit received the tip. Several days passed before approval came through. By the time U.S. troops conducted a nighttime raid on the two-story building, it was largely abandoned.

The loyalty and skills of the Iraqi forces allied with American troops in Baghdad vary. Some army units are dependable, but police who often live in the areas they patrol are reluctant to take on local militias.

Getting local police forces to respond aggressively against militias has been a challenge, Pasquarette said. He has ordered letters, in Arabic, to be sent to every police officer and official in his area, warning: If you don’t combat militias, you’ll be fired. If you’re found to be supporting them, you’ll be detained.

“To fight these extrajudicial killings effectively, we need to be embedded, almost one to one, with the Iraqi security forces,” said Sgt. 1st Class Jeff Nelson, an intelligence analyst with the U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, based in Baghdad. “We need to watch their every move.”

In Hurriyah, a neighborhood in northwest Baghdad, sectarian violence has been hard to fight because the area is controlled by the Mahdi Army militia loyal to anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The Mahdi Army is brutal in pursuit of its goals, Nelson said. Large red X’s are painted on the sides of houses the militia wants vacated, he said. Residents know they have a few days to leave before their houses are firebombed.

Shiite attacks are countered by Sunnis. Mutilated bodies are usually discovered in the area’s trash-strewn soccer field, he said.

Without the ability to identify victims, it’s difficult for investigators to piece the crimes together. When U.S. forces do get good intelligence on a death squad or killing, plans for any raid are typically shared with Iraq’s security forces, leading to leaks and blown operations, Nelson said.

Capt. Alan Renazco, the squadron’s fire support officer, said troops are often asked to hunt down death squads and insurgents – but avoid being overly aggressive – and gather evidence to later convict a suspect.

“We’re not trained in this. We’re not cops,” he said. “We just want them to settle down long enough to get out of here.”