Officials Feel Hanford Explosion Well-Handled Response Appeared Chaotic, But ‘A Number Of Things Went Well’

Hanford officials patted themselves on the back Friday for their handling of a chemical explosion, while admitting that off-site emergency officials were notified too late and errors may have exposed workers to chemicals.

While the response to the May 14 explosion appeared chaotic, officials for the U.S. Department of Energy believe things generally were well-handled.

“A number of things went well when this event occurred,” Paul Kruger, director of environment, safety and health for DOE at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, told a news conference in Richland, near the reservation.

That included the shutdown of most traffic on the 560-square-mile site, the order that workers remain indoors and quick work to determine that no radioactive materials had escaped.

But he acknowledged some problems, particularly the slow notification of off-site law enforcement and federal and state emergency agencies.

There was also a mishap in which eight workers were mistakenly ordered by superiors to leave the safety of a trailer and head to the building where the blast occurred. Some of those workers are now complaining of illnesses.

Energy Department officials said those problems will be corrected.

The May 14 blast at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility was caused when hydroxylamine nitrate and nitric acid in a storage tank dried out and became unstable.

The blast blew the lid off the 400-gallon tank and sent a chemical plume out of the building.

The DOE investigation has found that monitoring of the tank’s contents inexplicably ended last Oct. 28, even though it was known that the contents could become unstable if water levels dropped too low. It is still not clear why the monitoring stopped.

Hanford for four decades made plutonium for nuclear weapons, and the site now contains the nation’s greatest collection of radioactive defense wastes.

While no radiation was involved in this blast, the accident has raised concerns about the safety of nuclear wastes stored in 177 giant underground tanks.

Some of those tanks have the potential to explode and spew huge doses of radiation into the environment.

While the Hanford blast occurred at 7:53 p.m., off-site emergency officials were not notified for three hours. Had there been a danger to the surrounding area, that delay would have prevented timely evacuations, some officials have noted.

One reason for the delay was that site managers did not immediately declare an alert after the explosion, said Steve Veitenheimer, another DOE safety officer at Hanford. Such a declaration would require that off-site officials be alerted within 15 minutes.

With no apparent release of radioactivity, no immediate injuries to workers and indications that monitoring systems were operating property, the emergency director of the plant did not feel an alert status was warranted, Veitenheimer said.

There were no monitors around the plant to detect hazardous chemicals, officials said. Veitenheimer said that is another problem area that must be studied.

Around 10 p.m., more than two hours after the blast, the building emergency director changed his mind and declared an alert, Veitenheimer said.

Yet even though the alert was declared at 10:05 p.m., it was still more than an hour before off-site officials were called, he acknowledged.

“We are trying to find out why and take appropriate actions,” he said.