Spokane should hire track inspectors rather than pursue folly of fines on certain rail shipments
We are notoriously poor at judging risk. We worry most about what we don’t understand, have never experienced or feel most powerless to control. We overlook familiar yet hazardous everyday actions. Risk management experts call this the “risk perception gap.”
Proposition 2 on the City of Spokane ballot challenges voters’ ability to perceive and evaluate risk, and to discern if the proposed mitigation makes sense.
Dramatic photos out of Mosier, Oregon, after the derailment of a train transporting crude oil on June 3, 2016 left people feeling powerless. Spokane is a classic railroad town, with the main lines running smack through the center. While we routinely shrug off hazards in the news from hurricanes, this was something everyone could relate to. That could have been us.
Except it’s not likely. And Proposition 2 won’t make it less likely.
The Federal Railroad Administration had experts examining the causes of the crash while the fire was still cooling. Their task was to identify as quickly as possible if it was a one-off incident or a systemic problem and to take immediate action. Their Preliminary Factual Findings Report was issued June 23, 2016, less than three weeks after the derailment.
The train was traveling under the speed limit for the curve, equipped with conventional air brakes. The tanker cars were the DOT-111 style, upgraded with metal jackets but without thermal protection. Newer DOT-117 cars less susceptible to physical damage are being phased into the fleet by 2020, but older tanker cars are still in service in North America.
The Preliminary Findings determined the cause of the derailment was broken and sheared lag bolts in a poorly maintained section of track. A coupler punctured one of the tanks during the derailment, which led to the fire. The other three tankers involved also suffered mechanical damage. The report also discussed how electronically controlled pneumatic brakes would have provided additional control, “potentially shortening the stopping distance, and leading to a less severe derailment.”
And that’s the safety measure that counts, not the vapor pressure of the cargo. According to opponents of Prop 2, the Department of Transportation stopped using vapor pressure as a federal safety standard in 1990. Prop 2 opponents quote the Federal Railroad Administration in a September 2014 report as stating “using vapor pressure as a metric to identify potential hazards may not prove effective when considering real world accident conditions.” More robust track inspection, better brakes and tougher rail cars improve rail safety for all hazardous materials.
Fear skews the risk-perception gap. The proponents of Prop 2 point to the horrific explosion in Lac Megantic, Quebec, to paint a terrifying picture for Spokane. Except Canada was still using the old, unjacketed DOT-111 cars, which are more easily punctured. The safety issue was tankers easily damaged in a derailment, the cargo was along for the ride.
If we applied the same logic to vehicle crashes, we’d ban small children from riding in cars instead of designing better cars and car seats to protect them as they grow.
The key safety recommendation from the FRA Preliminary Findings on the Mosier incident was that “broken and sheared lag bolts, while difficult to detect by high-rail (inspection car), are more detectable by walking inspection.”
The most effective safety measure to protect the City of Spokane from all potentially hazardous cargo would be to hire their own track inspectors, accountable only to the citizens of Spokane.
Proposition 2 isn’t about rail safety. If it isn’t clear by the lack of focus on Federal Railroad Administration safety recommendations, it’s made obvious by lumping in coal with Bakken crude oil. This is a coy attempt to climb into the spotlight of the national debate over fracking and coal. And the price of admission to the game will be the legal fees the city will inevitably incur.